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Victor Zarnowitz
L The Problem and the Conceptual Framework
Backlog Accumulation.Short-run changes
in the backlog of orders received by manu-
facturers but not yet filled can be a very re-
vealing measure of the varying demand and
supply conditionsthat confront an impor-
tant segment of the American economy.In
the years since 5939 for which aggregate data
on manufacturers' orders are available, the
average volume ofbacklogs, especiallyfor
durable goods which account for the bulk of
unfilled orders, has been large, both in dollar
value and relative to manufacturers' sales (see
Table s).The large cyclical fluctuations in
unfilled orders, both in absolute amounts and
relative to current shipments, reflect the tend-
ency for the average delivery periods to length-
en and shorten in periods of expanding and
contracting demand, respectively.
In the late 5940'S and following the
long period of war economy, strong pressures
of demand on capacity prevailed much of the
time in large areas of industry.For buyers,
this often meant inability to get goods at their
current prices without longer-than-usual détiv-
ery delays. Many suppliers must have been
working at levelsof output where average
variable costs and marginal costs were rising,
the latter often very sharply. In this zone of
inelastic supply, the one-sided effect of ca-
pacity constraint becomes manifest: during a
single month, a firm cannot fill from current
output more orders than its physical capacity
to produce permits, but it can receive orders
far in excess of that amount. When orders
are accepted at such a rate and the increase
in unfilled commitments becomes greater than
thatinshipments, substantial delays must
presently appear between the receipt of an
order and the beginning of work on it.The
appearance of such lags in production starts
is a sign that demand has exceeded supply at
the prevailing price.
Conditions of this sort would be expected to
favor, and feed on, high-level expenditures on
plant and equipment. But in time such invest-
ment spending results in the growth of manu-
facturing capacity. During the recent post-war
period, that growth was certainly rapid by his-
torical standards and apparently also relative
to the expansion of manufacturing output.' By •This analysis was partiallyfinancedby a grantfrom
the Ford Foundation Faculty Research Fund of the Grad-
uate School of Business, University of Chicago. Thanks
for useful comments are due to Ruth P. Mack, Jacob
Mincer, Geoffrey H. Moore, Thomas M. Stanback, Jr., and
George J.Stigler.I am particularly indebted to Mincer
for helpful discussions of an earlier draft of this article.
Valuable suggestions were also made by W. Lee Hansen,
Paul W. MacAvoy, Peter Pashigian, and Lester G. Telser.
I am grateful to R. A. Gordon, Maurice W. Lee, and George
Soule, who comprised the reading committee of the National
Bureau's board of directors.Gerald Childs and Lee Sev-
erance helped efficiently with the statistical work. Marie-
Christine Culbert skillfully edited the paper and H. Irving
Fornian drew the charts with his usual care. I alone, of
course, am responsible for any remaining shortcomings or
errors.
I
'According to the estimates in Business' Plans /or New
Plants and Equipineni, annual surveys prepared by Mc-
Graw-Hill Department of Economics, the index of manu-
facturing capacity rose 67 per cent between 1948 and. z957.
In the same nine years, the FRB index of manufacturing
output increased only 4! per cent.
Inspection of charts on the ratios of backlogs to ship-
ments for the major manufacturing industries provides an-
other indication of the large increases in industrial capaci-
tiesduring thisperiod,for timeseriesofthese ratios
fluctuate around distinctly downward trends. The corre-
sponding series on unfilled orders in absolute terms show no
such strong trench; some of them seem to have mild incli-
nations downward; others have none. (These relations are
reflected in Table x; ci. the figures in columns (a) and (8)
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TABLE i. —LEVELAND AMPLITIJDE or MANUFACTURERS'UNFILLED ORDERS, SALES,AND BACKLOG-SALES RATIOS,
1946—59



























Oct. 1946 P 29.6 — Dec. 0948 P 8., — Feb. 1946 P 5.99
Sept. 0949T 07.6 Oct. T 6.3 —23 sept. 1949T 240 —60
Sept. 1952 P 75.' +327 July 0953 P 03.4 +004 July 0952 P 7.72 +220
Nov. 1954T 44.1 —41 Oct. 1954T 10.5 —22 May 0955T 3.51 —55
Jan. 0957 P 6n.o +38Jan. 1957 P 04.9 +43 July t956 P 4.54 +29
Oct. 1958 T 43.4 —29 April T —23 June 0959T 3.98 —34
NONDURABLE-GOODS INDUSTRIES
Dec. 0947 P 4.8 — April 0948P 2.6 — March P 2.06 —
June 1q49T 2.0 July 1949 T 2.1 —II June 0949T 0.92 —57
March P 6.z +202 May 1951 P 3.2 +53 April 1952P o.p7 +114
Dec. 1953 T 2.5 —59 Jan.1954T 2.7 —54 March 1954T 0.92 —53
Nov. p 3.6 +45Jan. 0957 P 34 +26 Oct. 1955 P 1.02 +22
June 0958T 2.5 —30 May T 2.9 —,5 July ig58 T 0.83 —26
o Cyclical taming points selected according to the roles adopted in the work of the National Bureau chronology(cf. Arthur P. Burns
and Wesley C. Mitchell,.tleasartngBusiness Cycles, NewYork, NBER, The series to which these turns refer are all manlhly
sod, eacept forthe unfilled orders of durablr.goods manufacture,,, are oeosonally adjusted.Unfilled orders for durable goods (lotal) show no
significant seasonal variation.
° Roanded off from data given inmillion dollars.The corresponding amplitudes were campuled from unroandedfigures.Unfilled orders
are end.of.n,onth'stock" figures;sales are monthly "flaw" rules.
o Based on the trough standinas for the risen and on the peak standings tar the falls.
Expressed an months of sales.Unfilled orders, as at the end of the month, divided by sales for the same month.
"The group reporting unfilled orders includes Lentils,, leather, paper, and priotiog and publishing. Order backlogsofother nondurahle.goods
industries are coasidered zero or negligible is the reported data.
Souscs:U.S.Department xl Commerce, Office of Businrts Economies.
2957,finally, the' demand pressures appeared
to abate and excess capacities began to replace
excess demands.It must be recognized that
the exceedingly large average size of order
backlogs in the preceding years reflected the
long-lasting effects of wartime developments
and induced distortions. But it would be un-
warranted to regard large backlog accumula-
tions per se as inherently due to such special
or exogenous factors,Afterall, widespread
business booms are a recurrent phase of the
United States economy.2
for the auccesaive peak dates.) From this, it can be inferred
that, in the aggregate, producers in each of these industries
must have acquired the capacity to handle the same volumes
of orders in less time.
Certainly such evidence as is available, including the
recent aggregat.ive data as well as the earlier and longer
series for individual industries, offers little support for the
view that "we must expect only under extraordinary cir-
cumstances to encounter the backlog of orders (Wil-
11am J. Baumol, Behavior, Value and Growlh
(New York, 0959), 8o1.In the cyclically sensitive manu-
facturing industries, unfilled orders appear to be, on the
contrary, not only very large at the height of a boom but
also quite substantial in more moderately prosperous times.
The reasona for this are explored later in this paper.
Although itisof considerable interest to
relate the observed backlog accumulations to
investment in capital stock and the ensuing
growth in capacity output, this is not the sub-
ject of the present analysis.This paper is
concerned primarily with short-run price ad-
justments to demand pressures, and the long-
run supply adjustments must remain in the
background. Of interest here is why excess
demand in some industries resulted in such an
accumulation of unfilled orders and in queuing
of buyers, instead of being more nearly ab-
sorbed by price increases, as was apparently
the case. in other industries. To put the matter
in extreme terms, assume a general expansion
in demand and consider two industries, both
working at full capacity (in the zone of steeply
rising marginal costs) and experiencing the
same degree of demand pressure.If one of
them reports only increases in prices and none
in backlogs and the other only backlog ac-
cumulation with stable prices, what would be
the industry or market characteristics respon-
sible for such a contrast? IORDERS, PRICES, AND BUSINESS FLUCTUATIONS .3
The problem seems to have attracted very
little explicit interest in the literature. How-
ever, Macblup views the second of these hypo-
thetical situations as symptomatic of pricing
that is based on costs only, in disregard of
changes in demand, and notes thatif such
"administered" prices prevailed in most mar-
kets an approximation to a model of "cost-push"
inflation would obtain.3In practice, he ob-
serves, this is hardly the case since many mar-
kets are competitive; moreover, even in those
markets where prices are administered, forces
of the "demand pull" are not absent in boom
periods since customers, anxious to get serv-
ice, will then often outbid the seller's list price
and make it irrelevant. Nevertheless, Machlup
recommends study of a theoretical system in
which all prices are held at some set (cost-
determined) levels even in the face of excess
demand, saying that "if there are, in actual
fact, many industries where backlogs of orders
accumulate while prices fail to rise and where
job vacancies grow in number while wages fail
to rise, then the model has some relevance
,, 4
Fromthe evidence examined for the present
study, itis clear that expansions in demand
which resultin backlog accumulations also
lead to price increases of varying but usually
sizable amplitudes. This is a significant fact,
anditcannot be lightly dismissed on the
grounds that there is no need to establish the
extreme case —thata sufficiently close ap-
proximation to it will do. For if both prices
and backlogs rise in apparent response to an
expansion in demand (new orders), then the
model of "cost-plus pricing" is no longer a
sufficient explanation and may not even apply
at all. The process may instead be interpreted
as a natural adjustment to the demand increases
by firms that are basically profit maximizers.
In this paper it will be argued that such an
interpretation is indeed quite sensible, given
the nature of demand expectations in cyclically
sensitiveindustries,the necessityfor these
producers to avoid uncertainty and plan ahead,
and the fact that these are typically firms for
which price and output variations are not the
'See Fritz Machiup, "Another View of Cost-Push and
Demand-Pull Inflation," this Review, xxviii (May sg6o),
125—139.
'ibid.,
only means of adjustment to a change in actual
or expected business conditions.
Media and Models of Adjustments to Busi-
ness Change. Rises and falls in demand, re-
flected in fluctuations in the volume of orders
received at given prices, can be met by (A)
increases and decreases in the current output
and/or price, (B) depletions and replenish-
ments of the inventory of the product, and
(C) accumulations and decumulations of the
order backlog.Despite the great importance
in practice of (B) and (C), the former adjust-
ment has been given a belated and still rather
incomplete treatment and the latter is as yet
largely ignored in economic analysis. On the
other hand, adjustments of type (A) received
early and extensive attention in the conven-
tional theory of price.5
In the limiting case of instantaneous reac-
tions of type (A), finished stock is always nil
and so is the backlog. The smaller the flexi-
bility of inputs, the more shifts in demand are
absorbed by price changes and the less by out-
put changes. According to the degree of input
flexibility, there is a whole scale of relative
price and output adjustments bounded by two
extremes: at one end, horizontal marginal costs
and reaction in output only, and, at the other,
vertical marginal costs and reaction in price
only.
It is well known that the marginal calculus
of cost and revenue assures, in this pure model
relying on (A) only, a continuous or period-by-
period maximization of profit;also, that the
'In the industry studies of the 1930's, certain segments
of the economy were said to react to fluctuations in de-
mand primarily through output changes,others mainly
through price changes. Large parts of manufacturing were
included in the former category and contrasted with agri-
culture, which was regarded as representative of the latter.
Here, too, the stock and backlog adjustments were given
littleattention. The introduction of backlog changes as
another dimension of the process observed in manufacturing
shows how industrial output can, to a certain extent, be
otabilized even in the presence of large demand shifts and
a high degree of price stability.In sectors in which there
are no backlogs, as in agriculture, relative output stabiliza-
tion of this kind is obviously precluded.
'Included here, of course, is the classical model of pure
competition, in which an individual firm can adjust only
its output rate in response to changes in the market price,
which it accepts as a datum. Shifts in demand manifest
themselves tothefirm only asthe price changes into
which they are translated by the market. Marginal costs
rise with the firm's output rate and are equal to price at
the point.4 ORDERS, PRICES, AND BUSINESS FLUCTUATIONS
model disregards some of the basic ingredients
of economic life —uncertainty,lags of adjust-
ments, cost of change as a function of size and
frequency of change. In manufacturing, par-
ticularly, the importance of these elements is
accentuated by the fact that the demand for
many industrial products is highly volatile in
the short run and subject to large and varying
cyclical movements. Rapid and frequent fluc-
tuations in production rates, however, are un-
desirable because they are a frequent proximate
cause of increased costs and reduced operating
efficiency.7 The greater the input flexibility, the
less is the urgency to stabilize production rela-
tive to demand, but input flexibility is never
complete over the whole range of output varia-
tion (though it may be high over a substantial
part of that range). Thus, the interaction of
demand and cost factors in an unstable and
uncertain world often favors the role of stocks
and backlogs as adjustment instruments or
shock absorbers.
The relative importance of these models of
adjustment depends in part on business condi-
tions in a given industry. A model which brings
this out very strongly, providing at the same
time a sharp contrast to the pure model of price-
output adjustments (A), would employ (B)
and (C) in the following cyclical sequence.
Assume that new orders move cyclically in such
a way that their rate exceeds that of capacity
production in the latter part of expansion.
Then, in the first part of the contraction in
buying, the level of production is sustained by
drawing upon the backlog of orders carried
over from the expansion. As the backlog is
exhausted and the contraction of new orders
continues, production is supported by working
up a surplus inventory of the product. During
the first half of the subsequent buying expan-
sion, that surplus finished stock is sold first (in
addition to the current output), whereupon, in
the second half, a backlog of unfilled orders is
again accumulated.
In making maximum use of (B) and (C),
this cyclical model magnifies out of proportion
Changes in the output rate will be accompanied by
changes in the size and/ortherate of utilization of the work
force, which are expensive in various ways: terminal pay,
training outlays, overtime premiums,idletime,possible
impairments of good labor relations, morale, or produc-
tivity.
certain elements of reality.Itimplies that
backlogs originate only in a strong boom and
disappear in a slump, and vice versa for fin-
ished stock. Although a tendency toward such
behavior probably does exist for certain prod-
ucts, it is too weak to show up in the aggre-
gates or even in the more narrowly defined
series in our sample. The model also treats
backlogs and stock accumulations in a strictly
parallel fashion, whereas in fact the two have
some implications that are quite different. The
risk that some of the unfilled orders may be
canceled during a contraction varies among in-
dustries but seldom seems to be large and often
is not significant.5 The risk associated with the
accumulation of unsold finished stock, on the
other hand, is, as a rule, much more serious and
always present in some degree, given the uncer-
tainty of future demand. Needless to say, new
orders do not behave in the neat symmetrical
manner assumed in the model. Instead, they are
for the most part notoriously difficult to pre-
dict, and this uncertainty favors the use of (C)
rather than (B). As a basic criticism, produc-
tion stabilization, howek'er important to the
firm for cost considerations, is presumably not
itself the primary objective, as the pure model
of the stock-with-backlog adjustments would
imply, and should thus be treated as a means
subordinate to, not as a goal commensurate
with, profit maximization.
Furthermore, the short-run response mecha-
nism found in practice frequently depends upon
certain structural industry or market charac-
teristics.It is not only in the advanced stages
of vigorous business expansions and in the
early stages of contractions that backlogs of
unfilled orders appear, because itis common
practice for firms in many lines of manufactur-
ing to undertake production in response to
demand ("to order") rather than in anticipa-
tion of demand ("to stock"). The important
distinction between production to order and
production to stock has, on the whole, been
neglectedineconomictheory,which —no
doubt for good historical and logical reasons —
proceedson the basic assumption that firms
plan their output to meet the expected, but un-
'See my "Timing ofManufacturers' Orders During
Business Cycles," in Geoffrey H. Moore (ed.)Business
Cycle Indlcatoa's (Princeton for NBER, 450—451.ORDERS, PRICES, AND BUSINESS FLUCTUATIONS 5
known, market demand. But in the present
context, production to order is clearly of major
importance.
Plan of Study. Section II of this study exam-
ines aspects of industry structure that bear in
an essential way upon the dynamic processes
to be explored subsequently. One result is the
demonstrably large weight of production to
order within the manufacturing sector. This
would be expected to enhance the importance
of backlog adjustments relative to stock ad just-
ments— (C) versus (B).
Section III deals principally with the rela-
tionship between changes in price and changes
in delivery period and backlog —(A)versus
(C). This is treated first in general analytical
terms (formulated mathematically in the Ap-
pendix),thenstatistically.Itshowsthat
changes in unfilled orders and delivery periods
do indeed function as a major instrument for
stabilizing the flows of output and shipments
relative to those of new orders. The role of un-
certainty and competition receives attention in
this context.Section IV, finally, provides a
summary.
ILOrders, Production,and Industry Structure
Manufacture to Stock and to Order. It will
be helpful to consider two models: one, pure
production to stock, and the other, pure produc-
tion to order.In the first, new orders are
shipped immediately upon receipt and hence are
virtually synchronous with and equal to ship-
ments. Orders that could not be so filled but
would have to be taken for future production
and delivery are either not placed or not ac-
cepted; in the absence of such advance orders
in the real sense, there are no backlogs. Here
the firm has to maintain at all times a suffi-
ciently large unsold inventory of finished prod-
ucts to meet current sales.In contrast, the
second case, by assuming production to order
only, implies that there are no unsold stocks
of the finished product.° Lacking such stocks,
'This ignores cancellations of orders, which may give
rise to some unsold finished stocks, but the relevant data
indicate that the importance of cancellations is on the whole
relatively small (except at times for military contracts);
and surely those cancellations that occur after the ordered
items have been produced must be the least frequent of all
because of the large risk of loss, an effective protection
the firm cannot, of course, handle any orders
for immediate delivery of the product in ques-
tion, but is limited to advance orders to be filled
from its future output.1°
Pure production to stock admits adjustments
of current output and price (A) and of stock
(B); those of order backlogs (C) are obviously
precluded. In pure production to order, price
adjustments are available to a firm that can
influence price.The rates of output reflect
those of new orders with lags; the greater the
input flexibility, the closer the relationship.It
is only with these qualifications, then, that one
can refer here to the type (A) adjustments.
However, while the volume of output under
contract is determined by past orders, the short-
period rate of output is not rigidly prescribed,
sinceitalso depends on the delivery dates
which are often subject, to a considerable ex-
tent, to the discretion of the producer. The
planned and the unplanned changes in the de-
livery periods are closely associated with fluc-
tuations irs unfilled orders, and these are the
"backlog adjustments" (C) that one would
presume to be particularly important in this
case. The stock adjustments (B) are here, of
course, not feasible.
A manufacturing concern is generally a mul-
tiproduct firm, often with a highly diversified
output. Some of its products may be made to
stock and others to order. Some may also shift
from one category to the other at certain times.
In particular, a product normally sold from
stock may temporarily be made to order when
orders for it run at peak levels and customers
allow lags on their deliveries.But there are
good reasons to believe that to a large extent
some goods are produced to order and others
•1•'
against which will be sought by the seller.(Cf. Thid.)
More evidence will be presented in my monograph
"Orders and Production in Manufacturing Industries: A
Cyclical Analysis" (in preparation).
"To formulate these two models algebraically, let o.and
s, be the flows of orders received and shipped, respectively,
during the unitperiod, say, month, and letz,bethe
corresponding flow of output or production. Then
o,— s,=a,—u._5 = (x)
andz, —s, = q,—q,_,= (2)
wherea, is the backlog, that is, stock of unfilled orders,
and q.isthe finished-product inventory on hand, both
measured at the end of the month C.Inpure production to
stock,o,= s,and =oin each period, so that a,
is always zero.In pure production to order, z,=and
=oin each period, so that q,is always zero.